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The KyrgyzstanUzbekistan Border:
A Legacy of Soviet
Imperialism
LIAM ABBATE

Abstract
Kyrgyzstan, a small country in Central Asia,
shares a complex border with its neighbor
Uzbekistan. While these borders were
created during the Soviet era, and were
drawn by leaders in Moscow, in the postSoviet years new problems have arisen from
the complex borders. A number of different
ethnic groups are spread amongst the five
Uzbek exclaves and two Tajik exclaves that
are located adjacent to Kyrgyz territory.
This difficult set of national borders also
complicates sharing the water that flows thru
the Ferghana Valley.

Introduction
In this paper, I will analyze the international
border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan, and how the contemporary
Uzbek-Kyrgyz border’s division of the
surrounding ethnic groups remains as a
legacy of the Soviet era. I start by explaining
the complicated border which is the basis for
the dispute. I then examine the origins of the
dispute back in the Soviet era, before
moving on to developments in the dispute
since Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan gained
their independence in. Finally, I explore the
wider geopolitical implications of the
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dispute, particularly in relation to the U.S.China rivalry.

Background
Kyrgyzstan is among the poorest of the
nations of Central Asia: its per capita is a
mere tenth of its larger neighbor
Kazakhstan.1 Formerly a constituent
republic of the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics, the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist
Republic declared independence as
Kyrgyzstan on August 31, 1991. Between
1924 and 1927 Soviet officials drew curly
borders for their then-constituent republics,
and in the process, they separated groups of
Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks inhabiting the
Ferghana Valley:2 home to nearly one
quarter of Central Asia’s population.3
Unlike the other former Soviet
republics of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has
largely experienced democracy since
independence. Revolutions ousted the
Kyrgyz presidents in 2005 and 2010; the
former revolution was peaceful, while the
latter included carnage in its chronology.4
Furthermore, a competitive election in 2017
resulted in a peaceful transition from
President Almazbek Atambayev to his
protégé Sooronbay Jeenbekov, without a
revolution. However, despite handing over
power, former President Atambayev
continues to harshly criticize the actions of
his successor. President Jeenbekov has also
worked to consolidate his power, as he has
threatened to imprison a political opponent
of his – Ömürbek Babanov – on the charge
of inciting conflict between the ethnics
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.5
Kyrgyzstan lies between Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan in the west and south, China
in the east, and Kazakhstan in the north. The
country is covered in mountains with 88
mountain ranges.6 These mountain ranges
separate communities within Kyrgyzstan,
contributing to regional differences and
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national instability.7 The capital of Bishkek
is the main population center for northern
Kyrgyzstan, while the area between JalalAbad and Osh comprises the most populated
part of southern Kyrgyzstan. As seen in
Figure 1, the former lies just South of
Kazakhstan while the latter area lies just east
of Uzbekistan; Osh and Bishkek are two
cities the lie outside of the seven oblasts
(regions) and hold an equivalent status as
the oblasts.8
The Ferghana Valley is an area
divided among Kyrgyzstan and its
neighbors: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The
valley’s fertile agricultural land produces a
large amount of food for Central Asia, while
subject to the availability of water.9 The
twisting borders and narrow stretches of
land are relics of Soviet rule and continue to
cause disputes between Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan. Its 10 million inhabitants
include ethnic Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks.10
However, during the Soviet era, residents
became accustomed to their ability to cross
the inter-Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), as
the Ferghana Valley lacked the border
controls present in other areas of the Soviet
Union.11

Figure 1. Political Divisions of Kyrgyzstan, map
from Bigstock (Richard Weitz, “Kyrgyzstan and the
Afghan Campaign’s Logistical Challenges,” Second
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Line Defense, last modified November 16, 2011,
https://sldinfo.com/2011/11/kyrgyzstan-and-theafghan-campaigns-logistical-challenges/.).

Misaligned Ethnicities in the Ferghana
Valley
While many countries have borders
that were drawn arbitrarily, Kyrgyzstan’s
borders are especially problematic. There
are five exclaves where portions of Uzbek
territory are completely surrounded by
Kyrgyzstan: Sokh, Shohimardon, Chon
Qora/Qalacha, and Jani-Ayil (Halmiyon), as
well as two Tajik exclaves.12 At 350 km2,
Sokh is the largest of these exclaves, and
according to Baumgartner, has experienced
several conflicts between its 50,000 Uzbek
citizens and the guards securing the Kyrgyz
border.13 To complicate matters further,
Sokh’s residents are 99% ethnic Tajiks.14
This mismatch of residency and identity is
not unique to the Sokh exclave; national
borders separate divide ethnic groups of the
Ferghana Valley while pushing together
other distinct groups (fig. 2; fig. 3).15
Furthermore, this disconnect between ethnic
identity and location within national
boundaries is especially pronounced in
northern Tajikistan, where Uzbeks and
Tajiks are interspersed16 like chocolate and
vanilla in a marble cake.

Figure 2. Political Map of the Ferghana Valley
(Sabatar, “Normalization process between.”).
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Figure 3. Demographics of the Fergana Valley
(“Central Asia: Tensions.”).

Ethnic tensions in the region are
nothing new and most recently flared up in
2010 when clashes between the two ethnic
groups left hundreds of locals dead.17 The
Soviet era infrastructure impacts
contemporary disagreements over water
resources and the border itself. A Sovietbuilt network of canals connects the water
supply systems of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan, causing disagreements over
how much water each of the three “stans”
should receive.18 In general, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan have an abundance of water but
lack electricity, while Uzbekistan (and
Kazakhstan) have excess electricity but a
scarce amount of water.19 There have been
multiple efforts to improve the water
distribution system in the Ferghana Valley.
The world bank funded improvements and
modernizations in Uzbekistan’s water
infrastructure from 2010 to 2016.20
Similarly, the International Water
Management Institute had a project started
in 2001 which sought to respect local needs
for water resources and improve the soil
fertility in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan.21 In 2017, Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan were able to agree on a dam on
the Naryn River, while in 2018,
Uzbekistan’s president announced his
support for the Rogun dam in Tajikistan.
Continued cooperation is possible, provided
the three nations are willing to overlook the
“deep-seated mistrust”22 that currently
exists.
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Throughout history the Ferghana
Valley had been subjected and inhabited by
numerous cultures, such as the Greeks,
Arabs, Mongols, and Turks, all of which
affected the socio-political landscape of the
valley.23 In the mid-19th century Tsarist
Russia conquered the Ferghana Valley from
the Khanate of Qo’qon.24 Also known as
Kokand, the Khanate was not ethnicallybased, but rather was a “dynastic and feudal
entity.”25
Many of the issues from the KyrgyzUzbek border and other borders in the
region are a product of Russian imperialism
– first in the way of the Russian Empire, and
later by the hand of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR). Before 1924,
when the creation of the KyrgyzstanUzbekistan border began, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan had not existed as sovereign
states. According to Megoran, there were
not Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups quite
the way there are today.26 Before the
creation of the border in the 1920s, ethnic
identification was not familiar to many
inhabitants of Central Asia.27 The history of
migrations in the region had not provided
clear, geographically segregated ethnic
groups. The Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, and
Kazakhs likely all descended from the
people inhabiting the Uzbek confederation
of the fifteenth century.28 The origins of the
Kyrgyz people are less clear, but the
consensus is that part of the Kyrgyz
population migrated from southern Siberia
to modern Kyrgyzstan in the fifteenth
century, but that another portion of the
Kyrgyz population is descended from
nomads who had arrived in the region long
before the fifteenth century.29 When
considered on the basis of language, the
Tajiks are distinct from the other four large
ethnic groups of post-Soviet Central Asia:
the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and
Turkmens,30 who all speak Turkic
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languages.31 The Tajik Language, however,
is a relative of Persian.32
The Soviet Union selected historical
designations and used them as the basis for
ethnicities, by codifying distinct languages,
selecting capitals for the union republics,
and compiling national historiographies.33
The ethnicity names created by the Soviet
Union did not match the self-identification
of residents of Central Asia: boundary
surveyors reported confusion about
matching people to ethnic labels if their own
labels were not on the official list of Central
Asian ethnonyms. Perhaps most
consequentially, the Soviet officials drew
borders between the Uzbek Soviet Socialist
Republic (SSR), the Kirghiz SSR, and the
other central Asian SSRs. Even after the
creation of these borders, many residents did
not “distinguish between Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan”.34

A New International Border
Kyrgyzstan’s most important
relations are with its neighbors: Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and China, as well
as nearby Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.
Uzbekistan has accused both Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan of inadequately protecting
their borders, allowing an unlimited flow of
drugs to travel across the latter two
countries.35 Uzbekistan relied on its
authoritarian dictator Islam Karimov to
strongly enforce its borders – Karimov died
in 2016.
Upon independence in 1991, the
border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
became an international border overnight.
Initially, the border was not tangible and the
respective countries made a minimal effort
to demarcate the border.36 However, over
the next few years, political and economic
differences between Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan caused the lenient border
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practices to disintegrate. In 1993,
Uzbekistan temporarily closed its border to
Kyrgyzstan and introduced its own unique
currency. Later on, Uzbekistan abandoned
daylight savings time and adopted the Latin
alphabet, all the while Kyrgyzstan kept
daylight savings and the Cyrillic alphabet.37
Disagreements have pitted the Ferghana
Valley portion of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan against the remainder of the
respective countries. During the 1990s, the
Ferghana Valley played an important role in
Tajikistan’s civil war,38 providing many
anti-regime fighters.39 Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan also experienced regional
instability in the 1990s, in which their
portions of the Ferghana Valley experienced
unrest. During that period, there were
extremists from the Ferghana Valley who
executed sporadic attacks in southern
Kyrgyzstan.40
The situation between Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan became more tense in 1999.
In January 1999, Uzbekistan closed its
border for an indefinite amount of time. On
February 13, 1999, President Karimov
declared that “Kyrgyzstan is a poor country,
and it is not my job to look after the
people”.41 In August 1999, The Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) – an
organization of “dissident Islamist guerillas
headed by Ferghana Valley exiles linked to
militant Islamist groups in Tajikistan and
Afghanistan”42 – invaded southern
Kyrgyzstan and adjacent areas of Tajikistan.
As a consequence of the IMU’s actions,
Uzbekistan began erecting a fence – which
is two meters high - along its Ferghana
Valley border; factories in Uzbekistan were
required to fire any employees who were
ethnically Kyrgyz. The creation of a
borderland continued as President Karimov
decreed that all visitors to Uzbekistan
staying longer than three days needed a
visa.43 Understandably, this did not go over
well with Kyrgyzstan, for as Karimov knew
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quite well, most Kyrgyzstan’s residents were
already struggling economically.
The Chinese and the Americans
The other important state actors
interacting with Kyrgyzstan are the U.S. and
Russia, who vie with China for influence in
Kyrgyzstan. The U.S. global war on terror
has affected Kyrgyzstan, albeit not as
severely as Afghanistan, and pressured it to
strengthen its border security.44 However,
Russia, China, and the U.S. do not place
Kyrgyzstan as a high priority, meaning each
state does not have the goal of eliminating
the influence of the other two.45
Nevertheless, these three major powers have
reasons to maintain an interest in
Kyrgyzstan.
China has the greatest reason to
worry; its officials fear that instability in the
Kyrgyz Republic could contribute to unrest
in China,46 particularly the autonomous
territory of Xinjiang which is home to a
large number of ethnic Uyghurs. Uyghurs
and Kyrgyz are both Turkic ethnic groups.
The U.S.’s concerns regarding Kyrgyzstan
derive from its proximity to Afghanistan:
only Tajikistan separates the two countries.
The short distance separating Kyrgyzstan
and Afghanistan has allowed the U.S. to use
Manas International Airport in the former
for its military operations in the latter.47 The
U.S. found this arrangement necessary after
Uzbekistan expelled U.S. military officers
from its territory in 2005.

Conclusion
The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border
dispute has taken a century to develop into
something threatening enough to make the
two neighbors adversaries of one another.
The borders as drawn by the Soviets fail to
align with the distribution of persons of
differing ethnicities; the enclaves only make
negotiations more difficult.48 Perhaps the
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national borders could be redrawn by the
countries themselves, allowing the borders
to align with the ethnic groups in the valley.
It would also be beneficial for the countries
of the Ferghana Valley (Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) if they could
devise a plan to share the water in the valley.
The situation would also benefit from
Uzbekistan being more understanding of
Kyrgyzstan.
Yet, perhaps Uzbekistan is not the
biggest threat to Kyrgyzstan’s well-being.
Megoran argues that middle-class Kyrgyz
people worry most about the elites
destroying the country. Uzbeks agree, and
one Uzbek told a researcher that the ‘big
ones,’ or the wealthy elites, “keep gobbling
[up] [Kyrgyzstan] the way they are at the
moment, the mountains themselves may
disappear”.49 This reasoning suggests that
Kyrgyzstan’s income inequality is causing
issues that should not be neglected.
Logically, the residents hope for no
continuation of the environmental
degradation that occurred under Soviet rule,
although the Soviet environmental damage
persists in Kyrgyzstan50 – and other portions
of the former U.S.S.R. This hope of theirs
opposes any plans to exploit the land and the
common people of Kyrgyzstan for the
benefits of the wealthier elites. Creating a
more just and equitable society could
improve the socio-economic stability within
Kyrgyzstan.
The first step in decreasing income
inequality is to decrease corruption in the
Kyrgyz government. If the politicians in
power ceased imprisoning their opponents
or purging governmental officials they
quarreled with, government transparency
and fairness could emerge. If international
aid was permitted to reach the communities
it is intended to benefit, better economic
opportunities could emerge for all residents
of Kyrgyzstan. Providing more economic
opportunities for the economically
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marginalized residents of Kyrgyzstan is the
most promising solution to this border
dispute, because a major source of tension
over the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border is
the movement of migrants from Kyrgyzstan
to Uzbekistan in search of better-paying
employment.51 Like many border disputes,
this dispute is a proxy: a proxy for the
sources of distress causing residents of
Kyrgyzstan to leave their homeland in
search of economic improvement in their
lives.
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